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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
STEVEN R. TODD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 920536-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992). 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defense. 
Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1992),1 
provided: 
(5) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty 
or no contest, and may not accept the plea until the 
court has found: 
xThis rule has since been amended effective May 1, 1993. 
(a) if the defendant is not represented by 
counsel, he has knowingly waived his right to 
counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(b) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(c) the defendant knows he has rights against 
compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury trial, and 
to confront and cross-examine in open court the 
witnesses against him, and that by entering the 
plea he waives all of those rights; 
(d) the defendant understands the nature and 
elements of the offense to which he is entering the 
plea; that upon trial the prosecution would have 
the burden of proving each of those elements beyond 
a reasonable doubt; and that the plea is an 
admission of all those elements; 
(e) the defendant knows the minimum and 
maximum sentence that may be imposed upon him for 
each offense to which a plea is entered, including 
the possibility of the imposition of consecutive 
sentences; 
(f) if the tendered plea is a result of a 
prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if 
so, what agreement has been reached; and 
(g) the defendant has been advised of the 
time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a 
plea of guilty or no contest. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Does the prosecutor's failure to comply with the 
terms of the plea agreement require that Mr. Todd be permitted to 
withdraw his pleas? 
Standard of review. The record incontrovertibly reveals 
that the prosecutor failed to abide by the terms of the plea 
agreement. "In reviewing the legal conclusions based on the 
underlying facts, [appellate courts] apply the correction of error 
standard." State v. Strickling, 844 P. 2d 979, 981 (Utah App. 
1992) . 
2 
2. Does the ineffective assistance of Mr. Todd's trial 
counsel during plea negotiation, entry, and subsequent proceedings 
require that Mr. Todd be permitted to withdraw his pleas? 
Standard of review. 
In order to bring a successful ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim pursuant to the Sixth 
Amendment, a defendant must show that trial counsel's 
performance was deficient in that it "fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness," and that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of the 
trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 
S.Ct. 2052, 2064 [, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693] (1984) . . . . 
See also State v. Templin, 805 P.2d [182,] 186 (Utah 
1990) (discussing presumption of trial strategy). We 
will not find deficient performance unless defendant can 
show "that counsel's actions were not conscious trial 
strategy." State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah 
App. 1992). We must therefore be persuaded that there 
was a "lack of any conceivable tactical basis" for 
counsel's actions before we will reverse a conviction 
based on ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. 
Moritzkv, 771 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah App. 1989). 
State v. Garrett, 207 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, 46 (Utah App. 1993) 
(footnote omitted). 
3. Do the plea affidavit and colloquy fail to comport 
with the requirements of Rule 11 and Gibbons, requiring withdrawal 
of the pleas? 
Standard of review. "Gibbons mandated that trial courts 
strictly comply with the requirements of Rule 11 (5)2 in taking 
guilty pleas and held that Rule 11(5) 'squarely places on trial 
courts the burden of ensuring that constitutional and Rule [11(5)] 
2In 1989, Rule 11(5) was redesignated 11(e) and minor 
organizational changes were made. Effective May 1, 1993 it has 
again been redesignated 11(5). 
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requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is entered. ' " 
State v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. 
Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987)). "Since questions of 
constitutional rights are questions of law, we give no deference to 
the trial court's conclusion . . . " State v. Mitchell, 824 P. 2d 
469, 471 (Utah App. 1991). 
4. Does defendant's misapprehension concerning the 
possibility of incarceration render the pleas involuntary and 
require their withdrawal? 
Standard of review. The trial court's factual findings 
are disturbed only if clearly erroneous. Legal conclusions based 
on underlying facts are reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Stricklinq, 844 P.2d 979, 981 (Utah App. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Steven Todd was charged with pattern of unlawful activity 
and multiple counts of theft by deception. R. 13-46. Pursuant to 
a plea bargain, he pled guilty to pattern of unlawful activity and 
one count of theft by deception. R. 78-80. As inducement and part 
of the plea bargain, the prosecutor gave John R. Bucher, defense 
counsel, a letter indicating that the State would stipulate to 
withdrawal of the pleas if the court sentenced Mr. Todd to a prison 
term. R. 123. This agreement was not disclosed to the court. Mr. 
Bucher advised Mr. Todd that the prosecutor's letter guaranteed 
that he would not serve time in prison. R. 250-5. 
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After entry of the plea, Mr. Todd asked Bucher to 
withdraw his pleas. Bucher again indicated the power of the 
letter, and did not move to withdraw the pleas. R. 322-3. The 
thirty day period for a motion to withdraw the pleas expired. 
The trial court sentenced Mr. Todd to prison. R. 102-3. 
Mr. Bucher disclosed the prosecutor's letter to the court, and 
moved for withdrawal of the pleas. R. 109-10. The state, contrary 
to agreement, opposed the motion. R. 113-6. The court denied the 
motion, and denied Mr. Todd's petition for certificate of probable 
cause. R. 129-31, 147. 
This appeal ensued. After hearing the petition for 
probable cause, this Court on its own motion remanded for findings 
on ineffective assistance. 
On remand, the trial court allowed withdrawal of the plea 
to pattern of unlawful activity due to inadequacies in the plea 
affidavit and colloquy with respect to the elements of the offense. 
The trial court entered findings. R. 325-9. 
This Court granted Mr. Todd's petition for certificate of 
probable cause, and Mr. Todd was released from prison. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 11, 1991, Mr. Todd was charged3 in an 
information with pattern of unlawful activity in violation of Utah 
3Codefendant Bryant R. Wilson was charge in the same 
information with similar (though fewer) counts. His case is 
currently on appeal as no. 920535-CA. The district court record 
for both these cases is de facto consolidated. 
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Code Ann. § 76-10-1603(1) (1990), a 2nd degree felony, and 58 counts 
of theft by deception in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 
(1990) (variously 2nd and 3rd degree felonies, and class A and B 
misdemeanors). R. 13-46. These charges stemmed from an auto 
brokerage concern called Rocky Mountain Auto Brokers, of which Mr. 
Todd was a principal. R. 29. Mr. Todd retained the services of 
Mr. John R. Bucher, Esq., for his defense.4 R. 73. 
On December 30, 1991, Mr. Todd entered pleas of guilty to 
a pattern of unlawful activity (Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603, 2nd 
degree felony) and theft by deception (Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405, 
3rd degree felony). R. 71-77 (aff. of Mr. Todd), R. 78-80 (minute 
entry), R. 177-92 (transcript of proceedings). 
As inducement to enter the plea, prosecutor Greg Skordas 
gave trial counsel for Mr. Todd a signed letter agreement which 
provided in full: 
John, 
As further inducement to settle this case, the State 
will affirmatively recommend that the defendants be 
granted probation & that if they are committed, contrary 
to the State's recommendation, to prison, we will 
stipulate to a plea withdrawel[sic] on both defendants, 
on all counts. 
[/s/] Greg Skordas 12/30/91 
See R. 3 04 (indicating this letter was submitted as an exhibit at 
12/14/92 evidentiary hearing). This letter has been attached as an 
exhibit to various prior memoranda (e.g., R. 123) . The original is 
4Although Grant Morrison and Ray Stoddard assisted Mr. Bucher, 
the trial court found that Mr. Bucher was the controlling attorney 
on the case. See Findings of fact, 1H 2, 3, (R. 325) . 
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unpaginated, but is contained in the court file between R. 12 and 
R. 13. A copy is attached as Addendum A. 
Mr. Todd and codefendant Bryant Wilson were instructed by 
their trial attorney, John R. Bucher,5 that the prosecutor's letter 
agreement to stipulate to withdrawal of the guilty pleas in the 
event of a prison sentence precluded the possibility that Mr. Todd 
or Mr. Wilson would serve time in prison as a result of the pleas. 
R. 250-5. They were further instructed not to disclose this 
agreement to the trial court. R. 253-4. 
Mr. Skordas signed the following statement in Mr. Todd's 
plea affidavit: 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State 
of Utah in the case against [handwritten! Steven Todd, 
defendant. I have reviewed this statement of the 
defendant and find that the declaration, including the 
elements of the offense of the charge (s) and the factual 
synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct which 
constitutes the offense are true and correct. No 
improper inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a 
plea have been offered defendant. The plea negotiations 
are fully contained in the statement and in the attached 
plea agreement6 or as supplemented on record before the 
court7. There is reasonable cause to believe that the 
evidence would support the conviction of defendant for 
the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and 
acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public 
interest 
/s/ Gregory G. Skordas 73865 
5Bucher has since been suspended for at least six months as of 
May 19, 1992. See Utah Bar Journal, Vol. 5 No. 7 (August/September 
1992) p. 26. 
6There was no attached plea agreement. 
7There was no supplementation on record before the court. 
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R. 76-77. Mr. Skordas' statement was incorrect and untruthful. 
The existence of the plea withdrawal stipulation letter was not 
disclosed to the trial court. 
Within a week after the pleas had been entered, Mr. Todd 
and Mr. Wilson asked Mr. Bucher to withdraw their pleas. Mr. 
Bucher refused to do so. See Bucher Affidavit, R. 322-3 at 13. 
Sentencing, originally scheduled for January 27, 1992, was 
continued to March 9, 1992 to allow time for a presentence 
investigation. R. 92. On March 9, 1992 Mr. Todd and Mr. Wilson 
were each sentenced to concurrent prison terms of one to fifteen 
and zero to five years, and were sent directly to prison. R. 102-3 
(Todd), R. 105-6 (Wilson). On March 30, 1992 Mr. Bucher filed a 
motion to withdraw Mr. Todd's guilty pleas. R. 109-10. Contrary 
to his prior letter agreement, Mr. Skordas opposed this motion 
rather than stipulating to it. See State's Memorandum in 
Opposition, R. 113-116. At hearing on May 18, 1992 (see transcript, 
R. 210-217), the court took the matter under advisement. R. 127 
(Todd), R. 128 (Wilson). On May 26, 1992 Judge Rokich denied the 
motion. R. 129-31. 
A notice of appeal for Messrs. Todd and Wilson was filed 
June 3, 1992. R. 132-3. A separate pro se notice of appeal was 
filed June 22, 1992 by Messrs. Todd and Wilson. R. 136,, The Salt 
Lake Legal Defender Association ("LDA") was appointed June 23, 
1992. 
A motion for certificate of probable cause was filed in 
the trial court on June 29, 1992 on Mr. Todd's and Mr. Wilson's 
8 
behalf by Ray Stoddard. R. 140. This matter was heard by the 
trial court on August 8, 1992, and Judge Rokich denied the motion. 
See transcript, R. 242-6.8 
LDA was appointed on August 3, 1992 as appellate counsel. 
R. 151. LDA filed a notice of appeal in the district court on 
August 13, 1992. R. 152-3. Case No. 920412-CA, a duplicate appeal 
involving both Mr. Todd and Mr. Wilson, was properly dismissed for 
failure to file a docketing statement. R. 301. 
Mr. Todd's Petition for Certificate of Probable Cause in 
the Court of Appeals was filed August 20 , 1992, together with the 
affidavit of Elizabeth Holbrook9 and a memorandum in support. A 
hearing was scheduled for September 15, 1992, but was vacated due 
to a problem with service of the petition. The Petitions for Mr. 
Todd and Mr. Wilson and supporting materials was refiled on 
September 9 and 10, 1992. The State filed a memorandum in 
opposition. A stipulated motion for expedited hearing was denied. 
The matters were heard on October 15, 1992. On this 
court's own motion, the matters were remanded to the district court 
for entry of findings concerning ineffective assistance of counsel. 
R. 299. 
An evidentiary hearing and argument was held in the 
district court on December 14 and 21, 1992 (R. 247-86) . The 
affidavit of John R. Bucher, trial counsel, was entered into the 
8This is a separate transcript. It is also included in the 
court file at 289-93, and again at 294-98. 
9Ms. Holbrook has transferred to a trial position within LDA 
and current counsel was substituted as appellate counsel in March. 
9 
record by stipulation. R. 320-1 (stip.), R. 322-3 (aff.). The 
trial court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law on 
March 5, 1993. R. 325-329.10 
In summary, the court's findings of fact are: (1) 
defendants were charged with Pattern of Unlawful Activity and 
multiple counts of Theft by Deception; (2) & (3) John Bucher was 
the controlling attorney for both Mr. Todd and Mr. Wilson; (4) & 
(5) Greg Skordas was the prosecutor, and executed the letter re: 
stipulated withdrawal of pleas if committed to prison; (6) the 
court was not informed of this agreement; (7) & (8) defendants 
are knowledgeable, etc.; (9) one element of Count I was omitted 
from the information by the County Attorney's Office; (10-12) re: 
elements of charged offenses; (13) defendants stated they had no 
questions re: elements of offenses; (14-16) trial court explained 
that there were no promises re: sentence (prison was possible) 
without objection; (17) trial court found pleas were entered 
knowingly and voluntarily; (18-19) defendants did not request and 
pleas were not withdrawn within 3 0 days; and (20-23) a hearing 
was held on ineffective assistance, Mr. Wilson testified, Mr. 
Bucher did not appear11 and Mr. Todd did not testify.12 
10A copy is attached as Addendum B. An additional notice of 
appeal was filed from the findings, R. 377 (Case No. 930207-CA). 
This appeal has been consolidated into the instant appeal. 
xlBut see Affidavit of Bucher, R. 322-3, R. 320-1 (stipulation 
to enter affidavit in record). 
12But see the transcript (R. 272:12-17): 
THE COURT: ANY OTHER WITNESSES? 
10 
In summary, the court's conclusions of law are: (1) 
defendants were not credible witnesses; (2) "It 'belies 
credibility' to think that Defendants would not say anything to 
either the Court or their counsel when the Court sentenced them to 
prison.";13 (3) there was "no credible evidence presented that 
Mr. Bucher was ineffective"; (4) the court allows plea to Count 
I to be withdrawn because of the omission in the Information; and 
(5) court denies defendants' motion to withdraw guilty pleas to 
Count II. 
footnote 12 (continued) 
MS. BOWMAN: I WOULD PUT MR. TODD ON FOR A 
VERY BRIEF OUTLINE OF ABOUT THE SAME THING. 
MR. SKORDAS: I STIPULATE THAT MR. TODD, IF 
ASKED THE SAME SERIES OF QUESTIONS, WOULD ANSWER IN THE 
EXACT SAME FASHION, IF THAT WILL SAVE TIME. 
"But see R. 400-401: 
[by defense counsel, Ms. Stam] LAST FRIDAY--
FROM THE RECORD [R. 202], THERE WAS A BENCH CONFERENCE 
AFTER THE COURT SENTENCED MR. TODD. HE WAS THE FIRST 
PERSON TO BE SENTENCED-- I INQUIRED OF BOTH YOU AND MR. 
SKORDAS WHAT THAT BENCH CONFERENCE ENTAILED, AND I 
BELIEVE THAT THE MEMORY WAS SOMETHING TO DO WITH 
CONCURRENT VERSUS CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES. 
I HAVE SPOKEN WITH MR. BUCHER TODAY WHO TELLS 
ME, AT THE BENCH CONFERENCE, WHICH WAS NOT RECORDED, THAT 
WHAT IN FACT OCCURRED WAS THAT HE PRESENTED TO THE COURT 
A COPY OF MR. SKORDAS' STIPULATION INDICATING THAT HE HAD 
AGREED THAT MR. WILSON AND MR. TODD CAN WITHDRAW THEIR 
GUILTY PLEAS, OR STIPULATED THAT THEY COULD. AND HE 
WOULD TESTIFY TODAY, YOUR HONOR, UNDER OATH-- AND WE 
TENDER HIM TO THE COURT-- THAT THAT IS WHAT OCCURRED. 
Judge Rokich remembers it differently, and declined to have Mr. 
Bucher testify. R. 401. 
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Judge Rokich allowed withdrawal of Mr. Todd's and Mr. 
Wilson's guilty pleas to Count I (racketeering, Utah Code Ann. § 
76-10-1603) . R. 330 (minute entry) .14 
Mr. Wilson (and by stipulation, Mr. Todd also) testified 
to several matters not contained in the trial courts findings: 
14It is far from clear that Judge Rokich had jurisdiction or 
authority to allow withdrawal of pleas while this matter was on 
remand for findings on ineffective assistance of counsel. See R. 
299 (Court of Appeals order of remand (two sided)) . In any event, 
the judge's decision is correct under the facts and law, and should 
be affirmed, or vacated and reentered by this Court, as 
appropriate. 
Of more concern are Judge Rokich's statements concerning 
the effect of withdrawal. Both Mr. Todd and Mr. Wilson were given 
parole dates based on both the 3rd degree felony and the 2nd degree 
felony. Judge Rokich opined that if the 2nd degree felonies were 
withdrawn, then the time served on both counts would then only be 
credited towards the 3rd. See R. 402-406. 
Mr. Todd does not agree. Ms. Stam cited the judge to 
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 
656 (1969). The Supreme Court held that upon reconviction after 
reversal on appeal, an inmate must be given credit for time served. 
Judge Rokich contends that withdrawal of the plea to the 2nd did not 
occur "on appeal." R. 406:15-20. This fine distinction is not 
well founded in logic or in the law. 
Guidance from this court on this issue would be extremely 
helpful to the trial court and the parties. Mr. Todd requests that 
this Court either: (1) find that the trial court was without 
jurisdiction to withdraw the pleas while this case was on remand, 
and formally reverse and allow the plea's withdrawal in this 
proceeding; (2) make a finding that withdrawal of the plea while 
on remand from appeal is "reversal on appeal" for purposes of 
Pearce and Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (1990) ; or (3) otherwise find 
that notions of due process and fundamental fairness require that 
Mr. Todd be given credit for time served if he is reconvicted. 
In this regard, Mr. Todd should also be given the benefit 
of the parole date granted by the parole board. Mr. Todd had a 
September 14, 1993 parole date on both charges prior to his release 
on certificate of probable cause on May 27, 1993. He thus should 
only serve an additional 110 days if his 1 to 15 year sentence^is 
reinstated upon reconviction. In an indeterminate sentencing 
scheme such as Utah's, the parole board is the entity that 
determines the ultimate severity of the indeterminate sentence 
imposed. It is not entitled to increase the severity of Mr. Todd's 
actual sentence, once that term has been set. 
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Q. [by Ms. Bowman] WHAT DID THAT LETTER MEAN 
TO YOU? 
A. [Mr. Wilson] IT MEANT TO ME. FROM LOOKING 
AT IT-- AND IT WAS SIGNED BY THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY--
REGARDLESS OF WHATEVER HAPPENED AT SENTENCING THAT OUR 
ATTORNEY COULD APPROACH THE BENCH-- IS WHAT HE TOLD US--
AND SHOW THIS TO THE JUDGE AND THAT OUR PLEA COULD BE 
WITHDRAWN AND WE COULD TAKE THE CASE TO TRIAL. THAT WE 
WERE GUARANTEED THAT WE WON'T GO TO PRISON OR TO JAIL 
BECAUSE OF THAT LETTER. AT THAT TIME, AND WE COULD TAKE 
OUR CASE TO TRIAL AND IT COULD GO FROM THERE. 
Q. IF YOU TOOK IT TO TRIAL, YOU UNDERSTOOD 
THAT YOU COULD GO TO PRISON IF YOU WERE FOUND GUILTY OF 
IT? 
A. YES, MA'AM. 
SL. BUT THIS WAS A GUARANTEE THAT YOU COULD 
NOT BE SENT TO PRISON ON A GUILTY PLEA? 
A_s_ EXACTLY. 
0^ . AND WHO TOLD YOU ABOUT THAT GUARANTEE? 
&i_ JOHN BUCHER, WHO WAS OUR ATTORNEY AT THE 
TIME. 
251:3-22 (emphasis added). 
THE WITNESS: JOHN TOLD US NOT TO TELL THE 
JUDGE ABOUT THE LETTER. AND THAT WE SHOULD JUST HANG ON 
TO THE LETTER UNLESS WE WERE SENT TO PRISON OR JAIL, AND 
THEN AT THAT TIME HE WOULD APPROACH THE JUDGE AND SHOW 
HIM THE LETTER THAT WE COULD WITHDRAW THE PLEA AT THAT 
TIME, WITH THAT LETTER. 
Q. (BY MS. BOWMAN) OKAY. AND WHAT WAS THE 
PURPOSE-- AND MAYBE YOU SAID THIS WHEN I WAS PASSING THE 
LETTER TO THE JUDGE, BUT WHAT WAS THE PURPOSE THAT YOU 
THOUGHT OF NOT SHOWING THIS LETTER TO THE JUDGE? 
A. HE TOLD US NOT TO SHOW THE LETTER TO THE 
JUDGE BECAUSE HE FELT THAT IF WE SHOWED THE LETTER TO THE 
JUDGE. MR. SKORDAS AND MR. BUCHER, WITH THAT LETTER 
OUTSIDE THE COURTROOM, THAT WE'D BE STEPPING ON THE 
JUDGE'S FEET: AND THAT WE JUST HAVE THIS LETTER AND THAT 
IF WE WERE SENT TO JAIL OR PRISON WE COULD SHOW THEM THE 
LETTER AND WITHDRAW IT. HE FELT IT MAY INSULT THE JUDGE 
THAT WE WAS TRYING TO NEGOTIATE SOMETHING OUTSIDE THE 
COURTROOM. 
253:6-11 (emphasis added). 
Q. WOULD YOU HAVE ENTERED THAT PLEA IF YOU 
KNEW THAT THAT LETTER WAS NOT A GUARANTEE? 
A,. DEFINITELY NOT. I WOULD NEVER HAVE PLED 
GUILTY TO A SECOND DEGREE FELONY AND A THIRD DEGREE 
FELONY IF I HAD THOUGHT THAT. WE JUST WANTED TO GET IT 
ALL WRAPPED UP AND OUT OF THE WAY BECAUSE WE HAD PAID OUR 
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ATTORNEY SO MUCH MONEY, AND EVERYTHING, AND WE JUST 
WANTED TO GET IT WRAPPED UP. 
Q. WERE YOU EVER TOLD THAT A JUDGE DOES NOT 
HAVE TO WITHDRAW YOUR GUILTY PLEAT?! 
A. HE TOLD US THAT REGARDLESS OF-- HOW HE 
PUT IT WAS THE POWER OF THIS LETTER, THE POWER OF THIS--
HE SAYS, "YOU GUYS DO NOT REALIZE THE POWER OF THIS 
LETTER." HE GOES. "REGARDLESS OF WHAT MR. ROKICH DOES--
JUDGE ROKICH DOES AT SENTENCING, WE CAN APPROACH HIM WITH 
THAT LETTER AND WE CAN CHANGE THE PLEA REGARDLESS AND YOU 
WON'T GO TO JAIL OR PRISON AT THAT TIME • YOU' LL HAVE THE 
OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE IT TO TRIAL." 
R. 255:5-23 (emphasis added). Mr. Wilson testified that Mr. Bucher 
did not explain the elements of racketeering or theft by deception. 
After entering the pleas, Mr. Wilson looked the crimes up in the 
library and concluded that he and Mr. Todd were not guilty. He and 
Mr. Todd requested that Bucher withdraw the pleas (about 6 to 8 
times) , but Bucher wouldn't, saying that the letter protected them. 
R. 255-8. By stipulation, Mr. Todd's testimony would have been to 
the same effect. R. 272:12-17. 
Mr. Bucher's affidavit is in accord with the testimony of 
Messrs. Todd and Wilson. It indicates that within a week of entry 
of the guilty pleas, both defendants came to his office and asked 
that the pleas be withdrawn, but Mr. Bucher "advised the defendants 
that the motion was premature and that the motion should not be 
filed until the trial court sentenced them." 
The trial court made its concerns clear: 
THE COURT: WHAT REALLY CONCERNS ME HERE, 
YOU HAD TWO DEFENDANTS WHO ARE NOT THE UNSOPHISTICATED 
TYPE OF INDIVIDUALS. THEY WERE BRIGHT ENOUGH TO PUT THIS 
BUSINESS TOGETHER. AND I WENT THROUGH THIS TRANSCRIPT 
AND WENT THROUGH RULE 11 AND ASKED THEM ON A NUMBER OF 
OCCASIONS IF THEY UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE WERE NO PROMISES 
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MADE BY THIS COURT,15 AND THEY DID. AND IF THEY'RE 
GOING TO BE A PARTY TO THIS TYPE OF CONDUCT, THEY ARE 
GOING TO PAY THE CONSEQUENCES. AND THE CONSEQUENCES ARE 
I'M NOT GOING TO FIND INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
NOR SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT. 
AND THEY CAN'T STAND HERE AND TELL ME ONE DAY 
THAT THEY UNDERSTAND AND KNOW ALL OF THIS AND I'M NOT 
BOUND BY ANY REPRESENTATIONS, AND THEN COME IN AT A LATER 
DATE AFTER I SENTENCE THEM AND TELL ME SOMETHING ELSE. 
THE JUDGMENT WILL STAND . . . 
R. 280:6-22. The court indicated its opinion that any 
ineffectiveness of counsel was harmless. R. 282:11-13. 
After the court entered its findings, an additional 
hearing was held on March 8, 1993, at which defense counsel 
objected to the court's findings. The following exchange occurred: 
[by Ms. Stam] LAST FRIDAY-- FROM THE RECORD, 
THERE WAS A BENCH CONFERENCE AFTER THE COURT SENTENCED 
MR. TODD. HE WAS THE FIRST PERSON TO BE SENTENCED-- I 
INQUIRED OF BOTH YOU AND MR. SKORDAS WHAT THAT BENCH 
CONFERENCE ENTAILED, AND I BELIEVE THAT THE MEMORY WAS 
SOMETHING TO DO WITH CONCURRENT VERSUS CONSECUTIVE 
SENTENCES. 
I HAVE SPOKEN WITH MR. BUCHER TODAY WHO TELLS 
ME, AT THE BENCH CONFERENCE, WHICH WAS NOT RECORDED, THAT 
WHAT IN FACT OCCURRED WAS THAT HE PRESENTED TO THE COURT 
A COPY OF MR. SKORDAS' STIPULATION INDICATING THAT HE HAD 
AGREED THAT MR. WILSON AND MR. TODD CAN WITHDRAW THEIR 
GUILTY PLEAS, OR STIPULATED THAT THEY COULD. AND HE 
WOULD TESTIFY TODAY, YOUR HONOR, UNDER OATH-- AND WE 
TENDER HIM TO THE COURT-- THAT THAT IS WHAT OCCURRED. 
THE COURT: LOOK, YOU KNOW, I THINK I HAVE 
PRETTY WELL MADE MY POSITION CLEAR. I DON'T HAVE ANY 
CREDIBILITY FROM ANY OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED IN THIS 
CASE. THEY CAN'T COME HERE ONE DAY AND TELL ME ONE THING 
AND COME HERE ANOTHER DAY AND TELL ME ANOTHER. JUST 
WHATEVER THEY THINK IS APPROPRIATE AT THE TIME. I HAVE 
FOUND THAT NONE OF THE PARTIES ARE CREDIBLE SO. 
THEREFORE. THEIR TESTIMONY TODAY IS NOT GOING TO CHANGE 
15The colloquy reveals that the court only stated that there 
were no promises with respect to sentencing. R. 178, 181. Mr. 
Todd is asserting the prosecutor's promise with respect to 
withdrawal of the pleas if the court exercised its unfettered 
discretion adversely to Mr. Todd. 
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MY OPINION. AND I THINK MY FINDINGS PRETTY WELL SPELL 
OUT WHAT TRANSPIRED. 
R. 400:16-401:15 (emphasis added). 
MS. STAM: THE ONLY OTHER THING, YOUR 
HONOR, IS THE AFFIDAVIT THAT WE PREPARED ON MR. BUCHER'S 
TESTIMONY, I WOULD ASK YOU TO CONSIDER ONE MORE TIME IN 
TERMS OF HE'S HERE TODAY AND WOULD TESTIFY UNDER OATH 
THAT BOTH MR. TODD AND MR. WILSON CAME TO HIM AFTER THEY 
ENTERED THEIR PLEA OF GUILTY AND BEFORE THEY WERE 
SENTENCED AND ASKED HIM TO ALLOW THEM OR HELP THEM 
WITHDRAW THEIR GUILTY PLEAS. AND WE WOULD ASK THE COURT 
TO ALLOW HIM TO TESTIFY OR AT LEAST ACCEPT THE AFFIDAVIT. 
THE COURT: WELL. YOU KNOW WHAT? THE FACT--
BUT MY PROBLEM IS THEY DON'T HAVE ANY-- THE THREE OF THEM 
DON'T HAVE ANY CREDIBILITY SO. THEREFORE. I AM NOT GOING 
TO ACCEPT THAT AS BEING A TRUTHFUL STATEMENT. I'M JUST 
NOT GOING TO. 
HE MAY SIGN THE AFFIDAVIT AND YOU CAN FILE IT 
AS SUCH, BUT I MADE MY FINDINGS THAT THEY'RE NOT CREDIBLE 
AND I'M GOING TO STAND BY THAT FINDING. 
R. 408:13-409:5 (emphasis added). 
By order dated May 13, 1993, this Court issued Mr. Todd 
a certificate of probable cause, and Mr. Todd was released from 
prison.16 
Mr. Todd has no significant prior involvement with the 
criminal justice system. While he is a relatively sophisticated 
individuals (especially in light of only having completed schooling 
through the tenth grade, R. 75) , he has had no prior experience 
with criminal law or criminal attorneys. 
16Mr. Todd had served over one year and two months, however, 
pursuant to a plea bargain where the State promised and Mr. Todd 
believed that there was absolutely no possibility that he would 
have to serve time in prison. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Mr. Todd's plea bargain was induced by the prosecutor's 
promise that the State would stipulate to withdrawal of the plea if 
the court sentenced Mr. Todd to a term of incarceration rather than 
probation. The court in fact sentenced Mr. Todd to incarceration. 
The State, contrary to its promise, opposed withdrawal of the pleas 
rather than stipulating to withdrawal. Because Mr. Todd did not 
receive the benefit promised in exchange for his pleas, the pleas 
must be withdrawn. 
Mr. Todd received ineffective assistance from his 
counsel. Mr. Bucher misstated the law concerning withdrawal of 
pleas and the effect of the prosecutor's stipulation, failed to 
follow Mr. Todd's directions to withdraw his pleas, failed to 
extend the time allowed for withdrawal, and withheld information 
from the court. Absent counsel's deficient performance, Mr. Todd 
would not have pled guilty, and therefore could only be 
incarcerated upon conviction by jury after full trial. 
The plea colloquy and affidavit fail to set forth the 
terms of the plea agreement, fail to show the necessary mens rea, 
and fail to include all the elements of the pattern of unlawful 
activity. Gibbons requires strict compliance. Mr. Todd's pleas 
must be withdrawn. 
Mr. Bucher advised Mr. Todd that there was no possibility 
of incarceration, because the prosecutor's stipulation to 
withdrawal of his plea would be binding on the judge. This 
information, in retrospect, was dead wrong. As a result of Mr. 
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Todd's misapprehension concerning the value of his plea bargain, 
the plea is not voluntary and must be withdrawn. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE PROSECUTOR'S FAILURE TO ABIDE BY 
THE TERMS OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT REQUIRES 
THAT MR. TODD BE ALLOWED TO WITHDRAW HIS 
PLEAS. 
The prosecutor's letter agreement17 is properly in the 
record, and the trial court specifically found that the prosecutor 
executed the agreement. Factual Finding 5 (R. 326) . Nevertheless, 
the State opposed Mr. Todd's motion to withdraw the pleas. R. 113-
116 (State's Memorandum in Opposition). 
A prosecutor's failure to keep a plea agreement requires 
withdrawal of the plea, as does the accused's entry of a guilty 
plea on the basis of a misunderstanding of the value of the 
prosecutor's agreement. State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1274-6 
(Utah 1988) ("It is well established that a prosecutor may not make 
promises which induce a guilty plea and then refuse to keep those 
promises."). "If the court or the prosecutor refuses to comply 
with the terms of the plea [after acceptance] , the defendant may 
choose to withdraw the plea. The trial court may not refuse to 
comply with the terms of the accepted agreement unless 
circumstances justify the declaration of a misplea; otherwise, the 
double jeopardy clause will preclude a subsequent trial of the 
defendant." State v. Kav, 717 P.2d 1294, 1304 (Utah 1986). 
17To stipulate to withdrawal of the pleas if the court, 
contrary to the State's recommendation, recommends incarceration. 
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United States Supreme Court cases also mandate that Mr. 
Todd be allowed to withdraw his plea. In Santobello v. New York, 
404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971), defendant was 
promised as part of his plea bargain that the State would make no 
sentencing recommendation. At sentencing, a new prosecutor 
recommended a maximum sentence. Defendant objected. On appeal, 
the Supreme Court reversed: 
This phase of the process of criminal justice, 
and the adjudicative element inherent in accepting a plea 
of guilty, must be attended by safeguards to insure the 
defendant what is reasonably due in the circumstances. 
Those circumstances will vary, but a constant factor is 
that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a 
promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be 
said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such 
promise must be fulfilled. 
Id. at 262, 30 L.Ed. 2d at 433 (emphasis added) . The case was 
reversed and remanded.18 See also Mabrv v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 
509, 104 S.Ct. 2543, , 81 L.Ed.2d 437, 444 (1984) ("when the 
prosecution breaches its promise with respect to an executed plea 
agreement, the defendant pleads guilty on a false premise, and 
hence his conviction cannot stand"). 
The State is attempting to hold Mr. Todd to his 
agreement, without upholding its part of the bargain to stipulate 
to withdrawal of the guilty pleas if the sentence imposed includes 
18Santobello was remanded for the state court to determine 
whether the plea agreement should be specifically enforced, or 
whether the plea should be withdrawn. Four dissenting justices 
indicated that the plea must be withdrawn as requested. In Mr. 
Todd's case, specific performance would be withdrawal of the plea. 
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incarceration.19 This the law will not allow. Mr. Todd's pleas 
must be withdrawn. 
POINT II. THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE MR. TODD 
RECEIVED FROM TRIAL COUNSEL REQUIRES THAT 
HIS PLEAS BE WITHDRAWN. 
A. DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE 
In order to bring a successful ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, a defendant must 
show that trial counsel's performance was deficient in that it 
"fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," and that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of the proceedings. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 
80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984); see also State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 
182, 186 (Utah 1990) . The only Utah case law addressing 
ineffective assistance of counsel in plea proceedings is State v. 
Ford, 793 P. 2d 397 (Utah 1990) . Ford sets forth the constitutional 
right to counsel in plea proceedings, but fails to delineate 
specific duties of counsel during the course of plea proceedings. 
Under the test of Strickland and Tempiin, Mr. Bucher's 
performance was deficient and prejudicial in the following 
particulars: 
19The State alleged (though Mr. Todd disagrees) that Mr. Todd 
breached the agreement by not consenting to the State's proposed 
restitution. If true, this fact does not help the state. If the 
agreement was breached, then it is of no further effect and should 
be withdrawn. The agreement stands or falls in its entirety. The 
State cannot pick and choose which portions of the agreement should 
be enforced, and which should be ignored. 
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(1) Mr. Bucher advised Mr. Todd that he should 
not inform the trial court of the State's agreement (to 
stipulate to withdrawal); 
(2) Mr. Bucher advised Mr. Todd to enter a 
plea agreement based on an undisclosed side agreement 
concerning withdrawal of the guilty pleas; 
(3) Mr. Bucher failed to withdraw Mr. Todd's 
guilty pleas when requested by him to do so; 
(4) Mr. Bucher advised Mr. Todd to wait until 
after sentencing to move to withdraw his plea, when this 
would put Mr. Todd outside the 3 0 day period allowed for 
motions to withdraw;20 
(5) Mr. Bucher failed to seek or obtain an 
extension of time for moving to withdrawal Mr. Todd's 
guilty pleas, so that he could be sentenced prior to 
expiration of the time allowed for moving for withdrawal; 
and 
(6) Mr. Bucher advised Mr. Todd that the 
prosecutor's stipulation of withdrawal was all that is 
necessary, when in fact a showing of good cause is 
required.21 
On the whole, Mr. Todd did not receive effective assistance from 
his counsel. There is no plausible tactical reason in the world 
why Mr. Bucher should have taken the above actions. Bucher 
misstated the law, ignored directions from his client, let 
statutory time limits expire without advising his client or seeking 
extensions, and withheld information from the court.22 
20See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (1990). 
21See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2) (a) (1990) . 
22Mr. Todd admits that Bucher may have had a bona fide tactical 
reason for not informing the court of the plea withdrawal 
agreement: it increased the chances of the plea being accepted. 
Nevertheless, this practice is questionable at best (a fraud on the 
court at worst) , and should not be encouraged by this Court. Even 
if tactical, there is no reason or excuse for Bucher's failure to 
advise of the risks inherent. Those risks have become realities, 
and Mr. Todd served over a year on a deal which he was told 
21 
The trial court found that ,f[t]he Court cannot make a 
finding of ineffective counsel because there was no credible 
evidence presented that Mr. Bucher was ineffective." This factual 
finding is contrary to all the evidence presented.23 The court's 
credibility determination is an abuse of discretion, and its 
factual finding is clearly erroneous. 
The State has stipulated to the existence of the Skordas 
letter, and the court found that it was executed by Skordas. The 
existence of this letter raises substantial questions regarding the 
adequacy and effectiveness of the representation received by Mr. 
Todd. Furthermore, there is no testimony or evidence controverting 
the statements of Messrs. Todd, Wilson, and their counsel as to the 
representations and advice given by Mr. Bucher. Under the 
circumstances, it is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to 
completely discredit all three witnesses. 
Other jurisdictions would so hold: 
It is a well-established rule in Arizona in 
civil cases that the trier of fact may not arbitrarily 
reject uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence from a 
disinterested witness where nothing in the evidence or 
the circumstances casts suspicion on it. The rule is 
equally applicable to criminal cases. A reviewing court 
will scrutinize to determine if there was any justifiable 
footnote 22 (continued) 
guaranteed that there would be no incarceration. Bucher also 
misstated the law, and told Mr. Todd that the plea withdrawal 
stipulation was binding on the judge, when in fact Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-13-6(2) controls (motion must be made in thirty days, and good 
cause must be shown). 
23The State did not call any witnesses, nor cross-examine any 
witnesses. All testimony presented was proffered by the 
defendants. 
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basis on which the trier of fact could have distrusted 
testimony, but where there is none, that testimony cannot 
be disregarded even by a jury. 
State v. Roberts, 673 P.2d 974 (Ariz. App. 1983). In this case, 
Mr. Bucher is disinterested. His only relationship is as former 
trial counsel for defendants. In fact, Mr. Bucher may have an 
interest in not disclosing facts concerning his ineffectiveness, in 
order to protect his own interests. His testimony must be 
believed. The testimony of Messrs. Wilson, Todd, and Bucher is 
consistent, coherent, and uncontradicted, and follows directly from 
the existence of the letter. 
The trial court found that Mr. Bucher had no credibility 
with the court based on some of the precise actions which Mr. Todd 
now asserts were deficient: his failure to disclose the letter 
agreement to the court, and his advice to his clients to withhold 
information from the court. Inexplicably, the trial court is 
unwilling to extend that deficient, perhaps unprofessional conduct 
to a determination that Mr. Todd has been deprived of 
constitutionally adequate representation. The judge's findings 
that there was no ineffective assistance, and if there was it was 
harmless, are contrary not only to the great weight of the 
evidence, but to ALL the evidence. 
B. PREJUDICE 
Mr. Todd has been prejudiced. Had the court been 
informed of the State's agreement, the court would either have 
accepted the conditional plea, or declined to accept it. Had the 
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court rejected the conditional plea, then Mr. Todd would be 
entitled to a trial by jury, together with its incident 
constitutional protections. Only upon a verdict of guilty would 
Mr. Todd have run the risk of incarceration. Had Mr. Bucher 
obtained an extension, or moved to withdraw the pleas when 
requested to do so, the motion to withdraw would have been timely. 
Had it been accepted, Mr. Todd would not have had to serve time in 
prison. Mr. Bucher's deficient performance has prejudiced Mr. 
Todd. 
The trial court disagrees: 
THE COURT: STRICKLAND, THE STRICKLAND CASE, 
RIGHT. AND THE OUTCOME WOULD NOT BE ANY DIFFERENT 
WHETHER THEY HAD INEFFECTIVE OR EFFECTIVE COUNSEL. 
MS. STAM: YOUR HONOR, THE OUTCOME WOULD BE 
ABSOLUTELY DIFFERENT. 
THE COURT: NO IT WOULDN'T. 
MS. STAM: THESE PEOPLE WERE PROMISED THAT 
IF THEY PLED GUILTY THEY WOULDN'T GO TO PRISON; THEY 
WOULD HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY THEN TO GO TO TRIAL. NOW, 
PERHAPS THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN CONVICTED AND WOULD HAVE 
GOTTEN PRISON, BUT THAT'S THE OUTCOME THAT WOULD BE 
DIFFERENT. THEY WOULD NOT HAVE ENTERED THEIR PLEAS HAD 
THEY BEEN TOLD BY THEIR LAWYER AND THE JUDGE AND THE 
PROSECUTOR THAT A STIPULATION BY THE PROSECUTION WAS NOT 
BINDING, BUT THEY--
THE COURT: DO YOU KNOW WHAT'S STRANGE? 
NO, AS I SAID, I'VE HEARD ALL THE ARGUMENT I'M 
GOING TO HEAR. JUDGMENT STANDS AND WE'LL GO FROM THERE. 
R. 282:11-283:15. 
The trial court misapprehends the value of the right to 
jury trial. See Santobello. 404 U.S. at 267 (Marshall, J. 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("This and other federal 
rights may be waived through a guilty plea, but such waivers are 
not lightly presumed and, in fact, are viewed with the 'utmost 
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solicitude.'"). Judge Rokich is certainly correct when he states 
that he personally would not have accepted a conditional plea. 
However, if the guarantee of no incarceration was not in place, Mr. 
Todd would not have pled guilty, and incarceration would only be a 
possibility upon conviction by jury. Mr. Todd believed the judge 
when he stated he could sentence them to prison. However, Mr. Todd 
believed based on advice of counsel that the court would have to 
honor the State's stipulation to withdrawal of the pleas if 
incarceration were ordered. Consequently, Mr. Todd believed there 
was an absolute, unconditional guarantee in place that he would not 
be incarcerated without first going to trial. 
In Santos v. Laurie, 433 F.Supp. 195 (D. R.I. 1977) 
defense counsel stated to defendant that if defendant did not 
receive the recommended sentence, the State had agreed to permit a 
withdrawal of the plea. The court ruled: 
Those facts also establish that the conviction was a 
product of ineffective assistance of counsel to such an 
extent as to render the proceedings a "sham", and to 
deprive [defendant] of his right to counsel. 
Id. at 198. The same is true here. Mr. Bucher was ineffective, 
and Mr. Todd's pleas should be withdrawn. 
POINT III. THE INADEQUATE PLEA AFFIDAVIT AND 
COLLOQUY REQUIRES THAT THE PLEAS BE 
WITHDRAWN. 
The trial court, on remand, admitted that the affidavit 
and colloquy were inadequate with respect to Count I, racketeering, 
and allowed Mr. Todd and Mr. Wilson to withdraw their pleas to that 
count. The judge's conclusion is correct, and the plea to Count I 
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must be withdrawn due to failure to properly set forth the elements 
of the offense in the information or at the change of plea 
proceedings.24 
On Count II, the affidavit and colloquy also fail to show 
that Mr. Todd understood the elements of the crime to which he pled 
guilty. The affidavit and colloquy further fail to disclose the 
terms of the plea agreement, in violation of Rule 11(e) (6) . 
Concern for the legitimacy or truth of a guilty plea is 
an integral part of ascertaining the voluntariness of 
that plea. Utah R.Crim.P. 11(e)(2)25 requires the court 
to find that a guilty plea is voluntarily made before it 
accepts it. A guilty plea cannot be voluntary if it is 
uninformed. 
State v. Breckenridae, 688 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah 1983). 
In State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that "Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial 
courts the burden of ensuring that constitutional and Rule 11(e) 
requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is entered." In 
State v. Maauire, 83 0 P. 2d 216 (Utah 1992) the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed its 
holding that (1) strict compliance with the elements of 
rule 11 is required in the taking of guilty pleas and (2) 
said compliance may be demonstrated by reference to the 
record of the plea proceedings. When plea affidavits are 
properly incorporated in the record (as when the trial 
judge ascertains in the plea colloquy that the defendant 
has read, has understood, and acknowledges all the 
24See also footnote 14, supra, discussing the propriety of 
allowing withdrawal while on remand, and the effect of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-405 and North Carolina v. Pearce on possible 
reconviction. 
25At the time of Mr. Todd's plea, designated 11(5) (b). 
Effective May 1, 1993 it was again redesignated 11(e) (2) . 
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information contained therein), they may properly form a 
part of the basis for finding rule 11 compliance. 
Id. at 217. 
In this case, reference to the affidavit does not cure 
the inadequate plea colloquy. First, the affidavit is not properly 
incorporated into the record. 
It is critical, however, that strict Rule 11 compliance 
be demonstrated on the record at the time the guilty or 
no contest plea is entered. Therefore, if an affidavit 
is used to aid Rule 11 compliance, it must be addressed 
during the plea hearing. The trial court must conduct an 
inquiry to establish that the defendant understands the 
affidavit and voluntarily signed it. 
State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 477 (Utah App. 1991) (citations 
omitted), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). 
More importantly, the affidavit is itself incomplete. 
The Skordas letter is not disclosed, and the required intent is not 
shown. See State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1335 (Utah App. 1989) 
(incomplete affidavit coupled with inquiry only into voluntariness 
and understanding fails to meet Gibbons strict compliance 
requirements). 
The plea affidavit signed by Steven Todd states: 
The elements of the crime (s) of which I am 
charged are as follows: [handwritten] as a group there 
was direct or indirect participation in an enterprise 
that functions through a pattern of unlawful activity. 
My conduct, and the conduct of other persons 
for which I am criminally liable, that constitutes the 
elements of the crime(s) charged are as follows: 
[handwritten] I helped participate in a car brokerage 
that had as a pattern of activity theft by deception on 
customers seeking a car 
R. 72. Mr. Wilson's plea affidavit is similar, R. 83. Nothing in 
this statement indicat es that Mr-. Todd, had the intent to "obtain[] 
27 
or exercise[] control over property of another by deception and 
with a purpose to deprive him thereof." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 
(1990). 
The plea colloquy likewise fails to show intent: 
THE COURT: AND THE FACTS IN THIS CASE ARE 
THAT, MR. TODD, YOU STATE THAT YOU HELPED PARTICIPATE IN 
A CAR BROKERAGE THAT HAD A PATTERN OF ACTIVITY THEFT BY 
DECEPTION ON CUSTOMERS SEEKING A CAR; IS THAT CORRECT? 
THE DEFENDANT TODD: YES SIR. 
R. 184:1-6. These statements are tautological. Mr. Todd pled 
guilty, but did not express the mens rea required by law. 
Similar problems exist with respect to disclosure of the 
terms of the plea agreement. See U.R.Cr.P 11(5)(f) (1992). The 
trial court did not inquire as to the terms of the plea agreement, 
as required by Rule 11(5) (f) . The fact that the Skordas letter is 
not an exhibit and is not discussed in the colloquy or affidavit 
shows that the court never inquired into or ascertained the terms 
of the actual plea bargain that was reached by the parties. The 
court did address promises concerning sentence, R. 178, 181, but 
never stated that there were no promises as to withdrawal of plea 
if the sentence he imposed included incarceration. 
Mr. Todd's pleas must be withdrawn because the affidavit 
and colloquy fail to meet the requirements of Gibbons and Rule 
11(5) . 
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POINT IV. MISAPPREHENSION CONCERNING THE 
POSSIBILITY OF INCARCERATION RENDERS THE 
PLEAS INVOLUNTARY, AND REQUIRES THEIR 
WITHDRAWAL. 
Because the guilty pleas were entered as a result of Mr. 
Todd's misinformed belief that he was immune from incarceration, 
they are involuntary and should be withdrawn. See, e.g., State v. 
Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1275-6 (Utah 1988); Machibroda v. United 
States, 368 U.S. 487, 493, 82 S.Ct. 510, , 7 L.Ed.2d 473, 478 
(1962) ("A guilty plea, if induced by promises or threats which 
deprive it of the character of a voluntary act, is void."). 
In Machibroda, petitioner alleged that he had been 
promised 
that he would receive a total prison sentence of not more 
than twenty years if he pleaded guilty to both 
informations. These promises were said to have been made 
upon the authority of the United States Attorney and to 
be agreeable to the District Judge. It was alleged that 
the petitioner had been cautioned not to tell his own 
lawyer about the conversations. 
Id. at 489, 82 S.Ct. at , 7 L.Ed.2d at 476. 
This case is quite similar to Machibroda, although the 
players' positions are somewhat changed. Messrs. Todd and Wilson 
were promised by the prosecutor's letter that they would not have 
to serve time in jail or prison. In both cases, the judge was not 
informed of the details of the promises. Defendants were sworn to 
secrecy (by the US attorney in Machibroda, and by defense counsel 
here). 
The Supreme Court held: 
There will always be marginal cases, and this 
case is not far from the line. But the specific and 
detailed factual assertions of the petitioner, while 
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improbable, cannot at this juncture be said to be 
incredible. If the allegations are true, the petitioner 
is clearly entitled to relief. 
Id. at 496, 82 S.Ct. at , 7 L.Ed.2d at 479. See also Tillock v. 
State, 711 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Mo. App. 1986) ("Here, the motion court 
found that Tillock was misled by his trial counsel when he was told 
that he could withdraw his plea if the trial court refused to grant 
probation. It also found, by implication, that such mistaken 
advice rendered the plea involuntary, which, in turn, resulted in 
manifest injustice when the trial court refused to let Tillock 
withdraw his guilty plea. These findings and conclusions are not 
clearly erroneous."; order setting aside guilty plea affirmed). 
In this case, Mr. Todd's allegations are not improbable. 
The existence of the Skordas letter prove them beyond peradventure 
to be true. Mr. Todd is entitled to relief. His guilty pleas 
should be withdrawn. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Todd's respectfully requests that his guilty pleas be 
withdrawn, and this matter be remanded for trial. In addition, Mr. 
Todd requests that this Court provide guidance to the parties and 
the trial court with respect to credit for time served if Mr. Todd 
is subsequently reconvicted on retrial. See footnote 14. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of July, 1993. 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Robert K. Heineman, hereby certify that I have caused 
eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84102, and four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 1st day of July, 
1993. 
Robert K. Heineman 
DELIVERED/MAILED this 1st day of July, 1993. 
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STATS 07 UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
•s. 
STEVEN RICHARD TODD, 
Defendant/Appellant.. 
STATS 07 UTAH, 
Plaintiff /Appellee , 
BRTAHT R. WILSON, 
Defendant/Appellant* 
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CASE NO. 911901397 
Appeal Ho. 920535 CA 
CASE NO* 91190139t£ 
Appeal No* 920536 CA 
This Court hereby enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. 
1. Defendants were charged with one count of Pattern of 
Unlawful Activity and multiple counts of Theft by Deception. 
2. They were represented by John Bucher, Grant Morrison, and 
Ray Stoddard. 
3. John Bucher was the controlling attorney on the case; the 
other lawyers were acting at his direction. 
4. Mr. Sfcordas of the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office 
represented the State of Utah. 
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5. Mr. Skordas had prepared a statement wherein he agreed in 
behalf of the State to stipulate to a plea withdrawal if defendants 
were committed to prison. 
6. Mr. Skordas, Mr. Bucher or the defendants did not apprise 
the Court of the agreement. 
7. Defendants are knowledgeable, appeared to be intelligent 
and to have sufficient business acumen to operate a car brokerage 
firm. 
3. While awaiting sentencing, defendants opened a modeling 
agency business which is indicative of their business ability. 
9. The Court read the elements of Count I to the defendants 
from the Information, citing Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1603(1) , 
Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended, but in the preparation of the 
Information by the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office am element 
was omitted. 
10. Mr. Skordas and Mr. Bucher concurred that Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1603(1), Utah Code Ann., 1953' as amended 
constituted the elements of pattern of unlawful activity. 
11. The Court read to the defendants the elements of Count 
II, Theft by Deception, from Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 405, Utah 
Code Ann., 1953 as amended. 
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12. Mr. Skordas and Mr. Bucher concurred that Title 76, 
Chapter 6, Section 405, set forth the elements of Theft by 
Deception* 
13. Defendants were asked if they had any question about the 
elements of the crime or any part of the proceedings, and their 
answer was "no." 
14. The Court explained to the defendants that there have 
been no promises made by the Court as to the sentence that would be 
imposed upon them. 
15. The Court advised defendants that on the day of 
sentencing they could be sent directly to prison. 
IS. Defendants nor counsel for the defendants, or for the 
State of Utah uttered an objection to the Court's reference to 
imprisonment. 
17. The Court found that the defendants had knowingly and 
voluntarily entered their pleas of guilty to Counts I and II. 
18. Defendants did not request to withdraw their guilty 
pleas• 
13. Defendants failed to withdraw their guilty please within 
30 days. 
20. An evidentiary hearing was held on defendant's Motion to 
Withdraw their guilty pleas because of ineffective counsel. 
21. Mr. Bucher did not appear as a witness. 
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22. Defendant Wilson testified at the hearing and his 
testimony was contradictory to his statements made at the time his 
plea was taken. 
23. Defendant Todd did not testify. 
CONCLUSIONS OP IAW 
1. The Court concluded that the Defendants were not credible 
witnesses• 
2. It "belies credibility" to thinJc that Defendants would 
not say anything to either the Court or their counsel when the 
Court sentenced them to prison. 
3. The Court cannot maJce a finding of ineffective counsel 
because there was no credible evidence presented that Mir. Bucher 
was ineffective. 
4. The Court will allow Defendants to withdraw their guilty 
pleas to Count I because of the omission in the Information , but 
not because the guilty pleas were not made knowingly and 
voluntarily. 
5. The Court denies defendants' Motion to Withdraw their 
guilty pleas to Count II. 
Dated this £ dav of March, 1993. 
JOHN A. ROKICH 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CZRTTPTCaTm 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, to the 
following, this > day of March, 1993:. 
Gregory Skordas 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Elizabeth A. Bowman 
Elizaberh Holhroolc 
Attorneys for defendant Todd 
424 East S00 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Karen J. Stam 
Ronald S. Fujino 
Attorneys for defendant Wilson 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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